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Abstract
The omission to define the term "investment" in the IC-
SID Convention is one of the most critical decisions that
has led to inconsistent jurisprudence and the resulting
debate regarding the propriety of the ICSID Convention
and investment treaty arbitration. The legislative his-
tory and the circumstances leading to the birth of the IC-
SID Convention strongly suggest that its main objective
is the protection and promotion of economic development
in the host State. Most of the propositions aimed at giv-
ing a meaning to the term "investment" in ICSID arbi-
tral practice have focused more on whether the scope of
the meaning of "investment" should extend to any plausi-
ble "economic activity or asset." The focus of this ap-
proach is flawed. It has relegated the element of"contribution to economic development" of the host State
to the back seat of investment treaty arbitration. This
article challenges this relegation as historic to the ICSID
Convention. The article argues that from the standpoint
of the host State, the ICSID Convention is meaningless if
the analysis of the relationship between FDI and invest-
ment treaty arbitration excludes considerations of eco-
nomic development in view of the omission in the ICSID
Convention. The article hinges this argument on the im-
plication of international development as the main foun-
dation of the ICSID Convention. The article
acknowledges the difficulty that may be associated with
the determination of an "investment" that contributes to
economic development, but contends that relegating the
element of "contribution to economic development" to the
back seat of investment arbitration is contrary to the
main objective of the ICSID Convention in host States.
INTRODUCTION
The jurisdiction of ICSID arbitration is regulated by Article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention.' The gateway to ICSID arbitration and
1 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, art. 25, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
(entered into force October 14, 1966), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/IC-
SID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) [hereinafter ICSID Conven-
tion]. The ICSID Convention established the International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The Convention was formulated by the Executive
Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the
"World Bank"). Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention provides:
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practice is, more often than not, determined by the meaning that may
be ascribed to the term "investment," pursuant to the ICSID Conven-
tion and the applicable investment agreement governing the invest-
ment dispute. In other words, the jurisdiction of ICSID arbitration
depends on the answer to the question whether or not the foreign in-
vestment that led to the investment dispute arbitration is an "invest-
ment" in line with the ICSID Convention.2 ICSID arbitral practice has
recognized and applied certain elements in the determination of an
"investment" because the term is undefined in the ICSID Convention.
In spite of the considerable consensus on certain elements that have
been applied by arbitral practice in the determination of the meaning
of "investment," the jurisprudence of ICSID, which includes scholars,
academics, and ICSID arbitral tribunals, are split on the definition of
"investment."3 Part of the debate revolves around the question of
whether there should be a separate consideration of "contribution to
economic development" of the host State of FDI as an element or char-
acteristic of the meaning of an "investment" as the term is understood
in the context of investment treaty arbitration in ICSID arbitral prac-
tice.4 However, the debate and propositions for a broader meaning of
The jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State(or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Center by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State, which the Parties to the dispute con-
sent in writing to submit to the Center. When the parties have
given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally.
2 ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities, THE WORLD BANK, https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=RightFrame&From
Page=Dispute+Settlement+Facilities&pageName=Disp-settl facilities.
3 See, e.g., David A. R. Williams & Simon Foote, Recent Developments in the Ap-
proach to Identifying an "Investment" Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Con-
vention, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 42, 47-48
(Chester Brown et al eds., 2011). (The authors addressed the piecemeal approach
to identifying an "investment" pursuant to the ICSID Convention. They observed
that" ... the progressive development of international investment law on the topic
of investment has led, perhaps inevitably, to piecemeal and sometimes inconsis-
tent approaches to determining whether there is an investment as the term is
used in Article 25(1)").
4 CHRISTOPH H. SCHEUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 133
(2009). See also Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v. Kingdom of Mo-
rocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Jul. 29, 2001), 6 ICSID
Rep. 400 (2004). The Salini ICSID Tribunal espoused what is now commonly
known as the "Salini Criteria" in determining what constitutes of an "investment"
in the context of the ICSID Convention. The decision of the Tribunal contributed
immensely to the intellectual foundation of the debate over the meaning of "invest-
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"investment," without a consideration of whether the investment con-
tributes to the economic development of the host State, forgoes a criti-
cal objective of the ICSID Convention.5 In this respect, the proponents
appear to be more concerned with extending the meaning of "invest-
ment" to include any conceivable economic activity in the host State.
The analysis in this article is focused on the element of "contribution
to economic development" from the standpoint of what may be consid-
ered the main objective of the ICSID Convention and the legitimate
expectation of host States in ICSID arbitration and international in-
vestment law.' In carrying out the tasks in this article, it is pertinent
to briefly comment on the concept of law and international develop-
ment. An analysis of the relationship between law and international
development may be utilized in understanding the circumstances and
considerations that led to the negotiation and ratification of the ICSID
Convention.
It has been argued that the rule of law with reference to devel-
opment "has become significant not only as a tool of development pol-
icy, but as an objective for development policy in its own right."7 This
article questions the mechanism of investment treaty arbitration and
ment" in the ICSID Convention. At paragraph 52 the Tribunal held inter alia that
".... [tihe doctrine generally considers that investment infers: Contributions, cer-
tain duration of performance of the contract and participation in the risks of the
transaction. In reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the contribution
to the economic development of the host State as an additional condition. In real-
ity, these various elements may be interdependent. Thus, the risks of the transac-
tion may depend on the contribution and duration of the performance of the
contract. As a result these various criteria should be assessed globally, even if, for
the sake of reasoning the Tribunal considers them individually here." The pre-
scriptions of the Salini criteria have been criticized because the criteria espoused
by the decision are not supported by the ICSID Convention. Thus it has been ar-
gued that applying the Salini criteria could lead to challenging the jurisdictional
requirements of the ISCID Convention as a matter of law. See A. Martin, Defini-
tion of Investment: Could a Persistent Objector to the Salini Tests be Found in IC-
SID Arbitral Practice?, 11 GLOBAL JURIS. 1, 2 (2011).
5 See, e.g., Julian D. Mortenson, Quiborax SA et al v Plurinational State of Bo-
livia: The Uneasy Role of Precedent in Defining Investment, 28 ICSID REV. 254
(2013) (arguing that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention "should properly be un-
derstood to reach any plausible economic activity or asset").
6 In the context of investment treaty arbitration, investment disputes may arise
from the violations of foreign investment agreements or contracts as a result of the
interference or the omission of the host State to act in a manner envisaged by the
applicable legal regime or international investment agreements.
7 David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David M. Trubek et al
eds., 2006).
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the context of the protection and
promotion of foreign investment within the framework of the ICSID
Convention.' The ICSID Convention is part of an international mecha-
nism for the arbitration of investment disputes negotiated by sover-
eign States to promote and protect foreign investment for economic
development.9
It is appropriate to note that economic development is the out-
come of a successful relationship between law and economics. For ex-
ample Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting have argued that China's
economic development and transformation success can be traced to the
important role and process of law.10 These commentators find support
in Justice Ocran who, writing extra-judicially, posited that the study
of law and development should be consciously used to meet the chal-
lenges of economic development. 1 1 The process of economic develop-
ment involves the interplay of law and economics that impact the
quality of life and infrastructural development of a sovereign State.1 2
Promoting and sustaining the economic development of a State chal-
lenges the political and economic activities of all sovereign States. 1 3
Indeed, the phenomenon of globalization continues to make economic
development a major challenge in developing countries. Developing
countries strive to catch up with global economic development through
the creation of international wealth for the benefit of its citizens and
the international economy.'" The recent economic downturn in the
United States, spreading to Europe and other parts of the world,
stands as a testament to the reality of the inter-connectivity of the
s ICSID Convention, supra note 1.
9 About ICSID, THE WORLD BANK, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowH%20ome&pageName=AboutICSID
Home.
10 Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China's Economic Development, in
CHINA'S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 377 (Loren Brandt et al. eds.,
2008). See also Mashood A. Baderin, Law and Development in Africa: Towards a
New Approach, 1 NIALS J. OF L. & DEv. 1, 4 (2011) (discussing the importance of
law and development in Africa).
11 TAWIA M. OcEAN, LAW IN AID OF DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES IN LEGAL THEORY, INSTI-
TUTION BUILDING, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 17 (1978).
12 Id.
13 Anthony Allot, The Law of Development and the Development of Law, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENTAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 49, 70 (Francis G.
Synder et al. eds., 1987).
14 See Robert Pritchard, The Contemporary Challenges of Economic Development,
in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 1, 3 (Robert
Pritchard ed., 1996) (arguing that "[aill countries aim to be as 'sovereign' and eco-
nomically self-sufficient as they can possibly can. They have a need therefore for
domestic financial institutions and mechanisms to encourage the highest possible
level of domestic savings and to develop efficient domestic capital markets ..
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global economy. From a legal perspective, the process of economic de-
velopment makes the relationship between law and development 15 rel-
evant to the challenges of economic development.
The reference to law in the context of this article implies the
combination of efficient domestic and international laws including
statutes, systems, international norms, and treaties that are designed
to promote and sustain economic development. The thesis of Trubek
and Santos states that the theory of law and development ought to be
examined as "the intersection of current ideas in the spheres of eco-
nomic theory, legal ideas, and the policies and practices of develop-
ment institutions."1 6 In spite of the recognition of some scholars of the
relationship between law and development, there is still considerable
debate on the actual role of law in economic development, particularly
with reference to international economic development. 17 In other
words, there is no consensus on the precise nature of the relationship
between law and development.1 8 Pritchard puts the issue this way,
"[d]espite the consensuses which have emerged on many of these is-
sues [economic development and foreign investment] the development
process remains something of an international intrigue . . . many of
the cast of this intrigue are very suspicious of each other.""
However, this article hypothesizes that the place and role of
law cannot be divorced from the process of economic development be-
cause law and development are mutually reinforcing factors. Accord-
ing to Morgan, "[tihe relationship between law and development, in
the context of an integrated global economy, has moved from a niche
area of study to an increasing central location in scholarly inquiry over
the past several decades."2 °
The intrigue complained about by Pritchard may be unraveled
by the progressive development or reform of the international norms,
systems, or laws that interpret the process and the factors that impact
15 The reference to development in this article is in the context of economic
development.
16 Trubek & Santos, supra note 7, at 4.
17 See generally, POVERTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: DUTIES TO THE
WORLD'S POOR (Krista N. Schefer ed., 2013); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD
INVESTMENT LAW (Marie-Claire C. Segger et al. eds., 2011); GOVERNANCE, DEVEL-
OPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION: A TRIBUTE TO LAWRENCE TsHuMA (Julio Faundez et
al. eds., 2000); and INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Paul De Waart et al.
eds., 1988).
18 Trubek & Santos, supra note 7, at 5.
19 Pritchard, supra note 14, at 4. The cast of the intrigue referred to by Pritchard
comprises foreign investors and the host State with respect to the relationship
between law and economic development.
20 See LAW IN THE PURSUIT OF DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE i, xvii
(Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2010).
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economic development. Economists believe that one of the factors that
can influence and contribute to economic development is FDI in the
territory of the host nation.2 ' Most developing countries solicit FDI to
attract foreign capital that will, in turn, contribute to the economic
development of the domestic economy. 22 Put simply, FDI is the acqui-
sition of assets, the transfer of capital, or the direct participation by a
foreign investor in the economic activities of the host State. 3 FDI in-
flows into developing countries in Africa and Asia have increased since
the 1980s.24 The legal regime regulating FDI facilitates access to in-
ternational markets, higher exports, and a means of importing foreign
capital into the local economy. It is intended to create employment and
impact infrastructural development of the host economy. 25 In other
words, the inflow of FDI contributes to economic development. One
reason for the need and increase of FDI to developing countries is that,
regardless of the abundance of human and natural resources in these
countries, these countries lack the necessary capital and technology to
promote economic activities that can effectively develop the domestic
economy. 26 The emergence and the interaction of the variables of FDI,
investment treaty arbitration, and economic development in the para-
digm of international investment law, is the product of the need to cre-
ate a system of international law to attract investment to developing
countries as a means to advance economic development. As a result,
the improvement of the international investment climate through the
protection of foreign investment became one of the principal objectives
21 Vintila Denisia, Foreign Direct Investment Theories: An Overview of the Main
FDI Theories 3 EUR. J. OF INTERDISC. STUD. 53, 53-59 (2010).
22 See Emma Ujah, Foreigners Invest $20 Billion in Nigeria within 3 Years-
Okonjo-Iweala, VANGUARD, Nov.12, 2013, at 16. (Ujah reported, quoting Nigeria's
coordinating Minister for the Economy, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, that Nigeria's
effort at attracting FDI has been successful in the last 3 years with the country up
USD$20 billion investment through FDI within the last 3 years); see also A. Ode,
The Robust Nigeria's Foreign Policy (2), GUARDIAN, May 16, 2013 at 84. (Ode is the
spokesperson for Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ode explained that "[in a
bid to encourage and promote inflow of FDI into the country, Nigeria has signed
bilateral agreements and MOUs with several countries in the areas of trade, tech-
nology cooperation, ICT, education, culture/tourism, etc.").
23 See WTO Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, 6 PRESS/57 (Oct.
9, 1996) available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres96e/pr057e.htm.
24 See FOREIGN DISTRICT INVESTMENT IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA: ORIGINS, TARGETS,
IMPACT AND POTENTIAL 1-2 (S. Ibi Ajayi ed., 2006).
25 See Denisia, supra note 21, at 104.
26 Id.
27 See ANDREAS F. LOWENFIELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 536 (2nd ed.
2008).
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of international investment law. 28 Accordingly, the World Bank cre-
ated a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) as an in-
centive to attract private international investment for the purpose of
promoting economic development in developing countries. 29 To be
clear, the protection of foreign investment is based on the theory that
the protection of foreign investment will encourage private interna-
tional investment in developing economies. In what appears to be tacit
support of this theory, the World Bank also initiated a concerted effort
to design and establish a mechanism for international arbitration of
investment disputes between State Parties and foreign investors.
The investment treaty arbitration mechanism initiated by the World
Bank was created through the successful negotiation of the ICSID
Convention. 31 The ta~ks of this article are hinged on the theoretical
assumption that "host States" connotes developing countries that offer
investment arbitration in exchange for FDI into their domestic econo-
mies. The underpinnings of the ICSID Convention were designed to
enable developing countries to give assurances for the settlement of
investment disputes through arbitration in order to attract private in-
ternational investments. 32 This article analyzes the matrix of FDI and
contribution to economic development in investment treaty arbitration
under the ICSID Convention with reference to the jurisprudence of IC-
SID arbitral practice. Parts I-III of the article are devoted to the ex-
amination of the history of the ICSID Convention through a critical
analysis of the travaux preparatoires and the law applicable in ICSID
arbitration. In Part IV, the article argues that the mechanism for in-
vestment treaty arbitration attracts FDI. This connection between
FDI and investment treaty arbitration calls for an independent consid-
eration of contribution to economic development imperative in arbitral
practice with respect to the ICSID Convention. Part V examines the
classical theory of FDI as the intellectual foundation of why "contribu-
tion to economic development" should be the core element in invest-
ment treaty arbitration.
The article hypothesizes that the purpose of the ICSID Conven-
tion is the protection and promotion of foreign investment for economic
28 See, Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 4, 6 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph
Schreuer eds., 2008).
29 For a more detailed discussion on the purpose of MIGA see IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHAT,
MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ORIGINS, OPERATIONS, POLICIES AND BASIC Docu-
MENTS OF THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY 22 (1988).
30 See Multilateral Inv. Guarantee Agency [MIGA] Rules of Arbitration for Dis-
putes Under Contracts of Guarantee art. 1, Jan. 1990, MIGGU Doc. GC-EQ-4,
available at http://www.miga.org/documents/Master-Rules-of-Arbitration.pdf.
31 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at 5.
32 Id. at 11.
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development in host States. Accordingly, it draws inferences from the
classical theory to theorize that economic development is the funda-
mental objective of FDI and the legitimate expectation of host States
with respect to the ICSID Convention. Part VI reviews the decisions of
the SGS Cases with reference to the definition of "investment" as the
term is understood under the ICSID Convention.3 3 This part of the
article advances the argument that "contribution to economic develop-
ment" should be the core element in investment treaty arbitration in
the context of the ICSID Convention. In conclusion, the article ac-
knowledges the difficulty that may be associated with the determina-
tion of an "investment" that contributes to economic development, but
contends that relegating the element of "contribution to economic de-
velopment" to the back seat of investment treaty arbitration endan-
gers the main objective of the ICSID Convention in host States. This
endangerment could generate dissatisfaction among hosts States
against the ICSID Convention.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION AND THE
PROMISE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
At the end of the Second World War, there was a worldwide
need to promote policies and programs that could spread international
development, particularly in less developed countries in the third
world. The attainment of political independence by third world coun-
tries from colonial masters that included Great Britain, France,
Belgium, Portugal, and Spain also made international development
imperative in developing countries. Against this background, the
United Nations commissioned a report by the Secretary General on
the international flow of private capital pursuant to Resolution 622 C
(VII) passed in 1952.1' Taking note of the findings of this report, this
august body consequently passed a Resolution to promote the interna-
tional flow of private capital for the economic development of underde-
veloped countries at its 510th Plenary Meeting of 11 December 1954."5
This Resolution received overwhelming support from the international
community. The U.N. passed the Resolution on the basis that the flow
33 The SGS Cases were better known for bringing the debate over the scope and
interpretation of umbrella clauses to the fore of ICSID arbitration. Umbrella
Clauses are provisions in BITs or investments agreements that create an interna-
tional obligation on the host State to guarantee the observance of the investment
contract it entered with the foreign investor. See generally, Jarrod Wong, Um-
brella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty
Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign
Investment Disputes, 14 GEo. MASON L. REV. 135, 135-77 (2006).
34 G.A. Res. 622 C (VII), para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/622 (Dec. 21, 1952)
35 G.A. Res. 824 (lX), U.N. Doc. AIRES/824 (Dec. 11, 1954).
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of private international investment to host States contributes to eco-
nomic development.3 6 The premise of the Resolution is that productive
activities resulting from the international flow of private capital con-
tributes to the standard of living and the development of human and
natural resources.3 7 The Resolution confirmed, "the flow of private in-
vestment has not been commensurate with the needs in those areas
where rapid development is essential for economic progress."3 ' Based
on the necessity of attracting foreign investment for proportionate in-
ternational economic development, the Resolution recommended that
countries seeking foreign investment should:
(a) Re-examine, wherever necessary, domestic policies,
legislation and administrative practices with a view to
improving the investment climate; avoid unduly burden-
some taxation; avoid discrimination against foreign in-
vestment; facilitate the import by investors of capital
goods, machinery and component materials needed for
new investment; make adequate provision for the remis-
sion of earnings and repatriation of capital
(b) Develop domestic and foreign information services
and other means for informing potential foreign inves-
tors of business opportunities in their countries and of
the relevant laws and regulation governing foreign
enterprise.3 9
In what may be a confirmation of the purpose of creating a via-
ble international investment climate for foreign investment as stated
above, the Resolution declared that "in order for new foreign invest-
ments to be an effective contribution to the economic development of
the under-developed countries, it is advisable to take into account,
among other things, the situation with regard to previously estab-
lished enterprises so as not to affect their normal development with
the national interest."4 ° Furthermore, under Paragraph 1 (a-c), the
Resolution recommended policy initiatives that might encourage and
protect foreign investment in the territory of the host State. 4 Admit-
tedly, it appears that the declaration in Paragraph 5 of the Resolution
points to the overall responsibility and purpose of foreign invest-
ment.4 2 This perspective may be justified by Article 1's apparent refer-
ence to and emphasis of the economic growth of developing countries
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. 1 1.
40 Id. 5.
41 Id. 1.
42 Id. 5.
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as the natural consequences of the implementation of the recommen-
dations under Article 1 (a-b).43
A. Options and Limitations of the Settlement of Investment Disputes
under Customary International Law
The Resolution passed by the United Nations significantly in-
fluenced the promotion of foreign investment through private interna-
tional investment. It may have laid the foundation for the relationship
of the variables of foreign investment and economic development. The
efforts of the United Nations contributed to the principles of custom-
ary international law by regulating the principal actors in interna-
tional investment law.4 4 However, the traditional principles of
customary international law regulating foreign investment subjected
foreign investors to various barriers in their home courts as well as in
the courts of the host State of their investments. Foreign investors
lacked legal standing under international law in host States.4 5 Since
States are the traditional subject of international law, foreign inves-
tors must go through their home States' and host States' legal systems
to settle foreign investment disputes.4 6 Also, as Judge Tomka rightly
noted, under customary international law, a State is only responsible
for a breach of an international obligation occasioned by an unlawful
act inimical to the principles of customary international law.4 7 As a
result, private disputes between foreign investors and State Parties
became very difficult to pursue.48
Some scholars suggest, under customary international law,
that a State may assert sovereign immunity to restrict the jurisdiction
or authority of a foreign court with respect to claims against the State
or to protect that State's property against foreign enforcement mea-
sures.49 In a case where a State asserts sovereign immunity, a foreign
investor has limited options to pursue foreign investment claims. Simi-
43 Id. 5.
44 See Muchlinski, supra note 28, at 6. (Stating that "[t]he earliest legal rules con-
cerning foreign investors and investment assumed a tripartite set of actors: the
home state, the host, and the investor").
45 id.
46 Id.
47 See Peter Tomka, Are States Liable for the Conduct of Their Instrumentalities?:
Introductory Remarks, in STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 7, 8-9
(IAI Ser. on Int'l Arbitration No. 4) (Emmanuel Gaillard and Jennifer Younan
eds., 2008).
48 See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET. AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 11, 20 (2008)
(The authors explained that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the host State
is absolute to prevent foreign investment claims against the State Party).
49 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT.78-80 (2004) (1994).
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larly, a foreign investor may also be denied legal process to assert in-
vestment claims based on the "act of state doctrine."5" Under this
doctrine, the home State of the foreign investor denies the investor
access to its court system on the ground that the cause of action is the
act of a foreign state not subject to the jurisdiction of the investor's
home state.5 1 Therefore, the only clear avenue for the foreign investor
to pursue investment claims against foreign states is through diplo-
matic intervention, or what is generally referred to as "gunboat
diplomacy."
Diplomatic intervention, or gunboat diplomacy, exists because
of the international law obligation of States to protect alien property
for the development of trade and investment in developing countries.5 2
In other words, this obligation under customary international law falls
under the rubric of the "Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens. '53 Gunboat diplomacy allows foreign investors to obtain relief
in respect of foreign investment claims through their government dip-
lomatic intervention or the use of armed force. 4 Capital export coun-
tries mainly employ gunboat diplomacy in cases of expropriation of
alien property or investments. 55 However, gunboat diplomacy brings
50 See id.
51 See David L. Jones, Act of Foreign State In English Law: The Ghost Goes East,
22 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 435-56 (1982) (discussing the rule of non-justiciability in the
context of the act of a foreign State); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
176 U.S. 398, 436-37 (1964) (where the United States Supreme Court held, inter
alia, in an expropriation case that: "However offensive to the public policy of this
country and its Constituent States an expropriation of this kind may be, we con-
clude that both the national interest and progress towards the goal of establishing
the rule of law among nations are best served by maintaining intact the act of
state doctrine in this realm of its application.").
52 See Francis J. Nicholson, The Protection of Foreign Property under Customary
International Law, 3 B.C. L. REV. 391, 391-93 (1965) (explaining that the develop-
ment of international trade and investment created certain principles which
placed an obligation on nations to protect the acquired property rights of
foreigners).
53 Id.; see also Edwin M. Borchard, Theoretical Aspects of International Responsi-
bilities of States, in MAX-PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 223, 224-30 (1929), http://www.zaoerv.de/01_1929/11929 1
a_223_250.pdf (discussing the theories and foundation of the international Re-
sponsibilities of State for injuries to alien property as a part of international law).
54 Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Investment: The Multilateral
Investment Guarantee and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 161, 164
(1996).
55 The allegation of expropriation of alien property or foreign investment against
the host State is one of the most critical factors that define the nature of foreign
investment disputes from the prism of investment treaty arbitration. Expropria-
tion or nationalization of foreign investments in the territory of the host State is
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limited succor to some foreign investors.5 6 There are notable examples,
such as where the United States and France employed it on behalf of
their foreign investors in Venezuela and Mexico respectively in the
1860s.5 7
Recourse to gunboat diplomacy in order to settle foreign invest-
ment disputes requires foreign investors to prove that they exhausted
all local remedies to no avail.5 8 A foreign investor may also have to
prove citizenship to his home government.5 9 The exhaustion of local
remedies subjected foreign investors to the jurisdiction of the legal sys-
tem of the host State. On the exhaustion of local remedies, Borchard
explains that "the government of the complaining citizen must give the
offending government an opportunity of doing justice to the injured
party in its own regular way, and thus avoid, if possible, all occasion
for international discussion."6 The foreign investor's home State may
refuse to directly seek relief on behalf of an investor for political rea-
sons, regardless of whether or not the foreign investor has a good claim
under international law.6 1 From the perspective of the foreign inves-
tor, subjecting investment claims to the jurisdiction of the host govern-
ment may lead to a conflict of interest between the host government,
the home government, and the foreign investor, thus creating an insti-
tutional bias.6 2 The conflict of interest between the foreign investor
and the home State may also arise because of political expediency in
the diplomatic relationship between the home State and the host
State.6 3 Salacuse has expressed the frustration of foreign investors
this way:
permissible under international investment law. However, it must be for a public
purpose, in accordance with due process of law and payment of compensation. The
payment of adequate compensation has, more often than not, been the bone of
contention in cases where expropriation is alleged against the host State by the
foreign investor. Expropriation may be direct or indirect. Expropriation may be
considered direct and easily ascertained, where an allegation of the actual taking
of the alien property or foreign investment in the territory of the host State can be
sustained against the latter. See generally Homayoun Mafi, Controversial Issues of
Compensation in Cases of Expropriation and Nationalization: Awards of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, 18 INT'L J. HUMANITIES 83-85 (2011).
56 DUGAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 27.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 30.
59 Id. at 32.
60 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD TO THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 817 (1925); see also DUGAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 30.
61 JESWALD W. SALCUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 40, 40-41 (2010).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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The potential for conflict among the three parties [the
foreign investor, the host country and the home country]
is ever present. In most instances, conflicts arising out of
foreign investments, results in disputes between the in-
vestor on the one hand, and the host country govern-
ment, on the other. The home country of the investor
may become engaged at the encouragement or request of
its national. In such conflicts, the host country often con-
siders the dispute to be subject to the host country law
and host country legal and judicial process... [the] host
government tends to see foreign laws and foreign courts
as irrelevant to any issues of disagreement with foreign
investors and may view any potential interference as an
outright challenge to national sovereignty.6 4
In addition to the issue of conflict of interest, there are also
potentially serious questions about the impartiality and the credibility
of the host country's legal system. This is due to the probable influence
or prejudice of the host government against the foreign investor.6 5 At
the same time, the foreign investor has no recourse to the home coun-
try's legal system because of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
in customary international law.6 6 Limited options to settle investor
disputes present difficulties as they make foreign investors wary and
skeptical about the prospects of their investments abroad.
Ultimately, the protection of foreign investment became a
problematic issue in the international efforts aimed at promoting for-
eign investment for economic development. The economic development
of the host State and the home State of the foreign investor could have
been gravely affected if something was not done to address the legiti-
mate concerns of foreign investors. Foreign investors from developed
countries desire bigger foreign markets for investment in order to
maximize FDI and repatriate profits that contribute to economic devel-
opment in their home States. In contrast, developing countries want to
attract foreign investment through private international investment
for economic development.6 7 Therefore, there arose a potential peril to
the variables of foreign investment and economic development because
there was no effective mechanism to protect foreign investment nor
overcome its limitations vis a vis the settlements or adjudication of
foreign investment claims. In other words, the absence of a generally
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 See Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in Devel-
oping Countries, 36 FIN. & DEV. 34, 36 (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/pdf/mallampa.pdf.
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acceptable system for the resolution of foreign investment disputes be-
came the weakest link in the international quest for the promotion and
protection of foreign investment. The problem became a significant is-
sue for international organizations charged with international devel-
opment, including the World Bank.
B. The World Bank, The ICSID Convention, and the Resolution of
Investment Disputes
The World Bank,6" established in 1944, assisted European
postwar reconstruction and development at the end of World War II.
With its success in Europe, the bank's responsibilities metamorphosed
into pursuing programs for the global reduction of poverty and devel-
opment in third world countries.6 9 In the 1960s, the World Bank be-
came concerned with the problem of settling disputes between foreign
investors and host governments as an issue affecting the promotion of
foreign investment. 0 On several occasions, the foreign investors and
host governments approached the World Bank to mediate the settle-
ment of their investment disputes. 71 These overtures to the Bank to
intervene were made against the background of the limited and unac-
ceptable options open to foreign investors and governments under cus-
tomary international law.7 2
In a note to the Executive Directors of the World Bank on "Set-
tlement of Disputes between Government and Private Parties," the
General Counsel of the World Bank suggested the establishment of
international arbitration as a way out of the imbroglio.7 3 The General
Counsel phrased the problem this way:
68 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1. The World Bank as used in this context is
distinguished from the World Bank Group. The World Bank Group currently con-
sists of five organizations. Full details of the World Bank Group organizations are
available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAI/EXTABOUTUS/O,,
pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.htm (last visited Jan.24,
2014).
69 See World Bank History, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-
TERNAL/ EXTABOUTUS.
70 See Gautami Tondapu, International Institutions and Dispute Seettlement: The
Case of ICSID, 22 BOND L. REV. 81, 83 (2010).
71 See Excerpt of the Address by the President of the World Bank to the Annual
Meeting of its Board of Governors, in HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: Docu-
MENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER
STATES 3 (Vol. II, Part 1, ICSID Publication 1968) (hereinafter HISTORY OF THE
ICSID CONVENTION).
72 Id.
73 Id.
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1. The many studies which have been undertaken in re-
cent years concerning ways and means to promote
private foreign investment have almost invariably
discussed the problem of the settlement of disputes
between foreign private investors or entrepreneurs
and the Government of the country where the invest-
ment is made. In many cases these studies have rec-
ommended the establishment of international
arbitration and/or conciliation machinery.
2. The absence of adequate machinery for international
conciliation and arbitration often frustrates attempts
to agree on an appropriate mode of settlement of dis-
putes. Tribunals set up by private organizations such
as the International Chamber of Commerce are fre-
quently unacceptable to governments and the only
public international arbitral tribunal, the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration, is not open to private
claimants.7 4
The General Counsel then proposed the establishment of an in-
ternational mechanism for the conduct of arbitration of investment
disputes through the creation of a permanent tribunal and the provi-
sion of facilities for conciliation as an alternative to arbitration. The
General Counsel based his suggestions on the premise that States
should recognize the possibility of direct access by foreign investors to
an international platform for the settlement of disputes and that
agreement to submit such disputes to international agreements are
binding international obligations. 75 On September 19, 1961, recogniz-
ing that the World Bank was not fully equipped to resolve investment
disputes, the President of the World Bank echoed the urgent need for
an international arbitration system for investment disputes. The Pres-
ident declared that:
At the same time, our experience has confirmed my be-
lief that a very useful contribution could be made by
some sort of a special forum for the conciliation or arbi-
tration of these disputes. The results of an inquiry made
by the Secretary General of the United Nations showed
that this belief is widely shared. The fact that govern-
ments and private interests have turned to the Bank to
provide this assistance indicates the lack of any other
machinery for conciliation and arbitration which is re-
garded as adequate by investors and governments alike.
I therefore intend to explore with other institutions and
74 Id. at 2.
75 id.
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other member governments whether something might
not be done to promote the establishment of a machinery
of this kind.7 6
The proposal and the suggestions of the General Counsel to the Execu-
tive Directors of the World Bank thus laid the foundation for the pro-
cess to create the ICSID Convention.
The ICSID Convention is a product of three stages of intense
negotiations: a World Bank internal drafting stage, regional meetings
of legal experts from participating States, and a convocation of mem-
ber-states delegates.7 7 The convocation of delegates constituted the
"Legal Committee" that prepared the final draft of the Convention for
approval by the World Bank Executive Directors. 7' The most critical
consideration for the birth of the Center came out of the need to look
for innovations that could accelerate international economic develop-
ment. The discussions started in June of 1962 when the World Bank
commissioned a working group under the leadership of Aron Broches,
the General Counsel of the Bank.7 9 The World Bank mandated the
working group to produce a draft Convention for internal considera-
tion.8 o The first draft Convention produced by the working group ex-
tended jurisdiction to any dispute between the parties with a
minimum amount in dispute of $100,000, without reference to any
subject matter restrictions.8 " Upon review of the initial draft produced
by the World Bank working group, others raised questions concerning
the need to separate political or commercial disputes from disagree-
ments over legal and contractual rights.8 2
The questions raised in the initial draft laid the foundation for
the exclusion of political or commercial disputes from the jurisdiction
of the ICSID. s3 The second internal draft submitted in October of 1963
limited the jurisdiction of the Center to "any existing or future invest-
ment dispute of a legal character."8 4
Having specified and distinguished political or commercial dis-
putes from foreign investments, why was the term "investment" not
76 Id. at 3.
77 World Bank, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and National of other States, 7
(1965), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFilesfbasicdoc/partB-
section02.htm (hereinafter Report of Executive Directors).
78 Id.
79 Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and
the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 282 (2010).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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defined? A consensus existed among members of the World Bank
working group that investment disputes, to be adjudicated by the
Tribunals constituted pursuant to the ICSID rules, must be purely of a
legal character.8 5 The earliest omission to define "investment" oc-
curred when officials of the World Bank involved in the process de-
clared their keenness not to create a process that could lead to
incessant disputes over foreign investments.8 6 Officials expressed the
view that "to include a more precise definition would tend to open the
door to frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Conven-
tion to a particular undertaking, thus undermining the primary objec-
tive."" It is evident from the preamble of the ICSID Convention that
the need for economic development through private international in-
vestments is the main purpose of the ICSID Convention.88 The follow-
ing propositions are discernible from the preamble of the ICSID
Convention: (i) to give assurances in writing to foreign investors
mostly from the developed economies of the protection of foreign in-
vestment, and (ii) to encourage international economic development
through private investments.
In support of the discernible propositions on the objective of the
ICSID Convention, the history of the Convention confirmed, "if the
plans established for the growth in the economies of the developing
countries were to be realized, it would be necessary to supplement the
resources flowing to these countries from bilateral and multilateral
government sources by additional investment originating in the pri-
vate sector." 9 Therefore, the hypothesis is this: a mechanism that
does not reflect or mandate the consideration of economic development
of the host State is contrary to the primary purpose of the ICSID Con-
vention. Once there is the admission of foreign investment, there
should be a corresponding extension of the term investment to include
contribution to economic development. But, the deliberate omission to
define "investment" under the ISCID Convention appears to relegate
the requirement of economic development to a back seat, and priori-
tizes assurances given to foreign investors within the framework of the
ICSID Convention. The situation makes it difficult for developing
economies to maximize the benefits associated with the purpose of the
ICSID Convention.
85 Id.
86 ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 356 (2012).
87 Id.
88 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at 1.
89 Mortenson, supra note 79, at 263 n.14.
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1. The Council of Legal Experts
This stage of the history of the Convention involved consulta-
tive meetings of legal experts of the negotiating parties that took place
in Addis Ababa, Santiago, Geneva, and Bangkok between December
1963 and May 1964.90 During this phase, the contentious issue of the
meaning of "investment" created a dichotomy between capital-import-
ing countries and capital-exporting countries. 9 Capital-importing
countries wanted a precise definition of investment while the capital-
exporting countries preferred an unrestricted approach to the nature
of disputes the Center could adjudicate.92 It is on record that Sweden
canvassed for the exclusion of the term altogether.9 3
To resolve the opposing contentions represented above, the
World Bank proposed a definition of "investment" for the first time.
The Bank defined "investment" as "any contribution of money or other
asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, if the period be de-
fined, for not less than five years."9 4 The developed nations contended
that the proposed definition was too restrictive, in that it could create
impediments to investment agreements.9 5 In contrast, developing
countries articulated a narrower definition of "investment."9 6 Some de-
veloping countries wanted a regulatory framework that could guaran-
tee the exercise of sovereignty through control of internal affairs that
might overlap with the conduct of FDI.9 7
The working group reported that there was an impasse be-
tween the contending blocs and within the working group itself on how
to define "investment."" It appears that the World Bank favored a
broad definition of "investment" to protect international investments.
This is because there was a consensus on the need to spread develop-
ment to emerging economies, but not that the protection of foreign in-
vestment was the problematic issue. It is debatable whether the
interests of foreign investors would be better served by a broader
meaning of "investment," but this perhaps explains the reason why the
initial draft sent to the Committee of Legal Experts did not contain a
proposed definition of "investment." There is no other explanation in
the history of the Convention except the reservations expressed by the
working group of the World Bank at the drafting stage. The UK broke
90 Id. at 283.
9' Id. at 284
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 286.
95 id.
96 Id. at 287.
97 Id. at 288.
98 Id. at 289.
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the impasse by proposing a solution that allows a broader reference to
"investment" with powers given to State parties to stipulate their own
definition of "investment."9 9 The UK's proposition received wide sup-
port and acceptance. 10 0 The Convention eventually passed the Resolu-
tion for ratification in March of 1965.101 The UK's proposal did not
define "investment" per se, but rather deferred the issue to State par-
ties in their conduct of FDI. 102
On the notification mechanism, Article 25 (4) of the ICSID Con-
vention provides that "[a]ny Contracting State may, at the time of rati-
fication, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any time
thereafter, notify the Center of the class or classes of disputes which it
would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the
Center."10 3
The solution proposed by the United Kingdom on the definition
of "investment" may be contrary to one of the primary purposes of the
Convention. It appears to be tailored to cater to the protection of for-
eign investments without any economic development considerations
from the perspective of the host State. There was considerable agita-
tion that the meaning of "investment" ought to be in accordance with
the public interest. 104 According to the General Counsel of the World
Bank, "nearly all the definitions [of investments] which had been pro-
posed were in fact definitions of what the delegates involved believed
their governments would in fact wish to submit to the center."1 °5
Similarly, the consent provisions under Article 25 (4) enable
host States to limit foreign investments in areas they wish not to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the Center to protect the State advancement
of economic development. 10 6 Ultimately, the consent provisions could
foreclose investment opportunities that may lead to economic develop-
ment. Either way, critics defeated the consideration for economic de-
velopment as the fundamental purpose of the ICSID Convention.
Commenting on the controversy surrounding the omission to define
"investment," Mortenson argued that there was an unsuccessful at-
tempt to define the term. 10 7 He stated that the consequence of the
"failed" definition of "investment" is to give State parties to the ICSID
Convention the freedom to define the term in their individual transac-
99 Id. at 292.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 290-91.
103 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 82 (2001).
104 Mortenson, supra note 79, at 289-90.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 293-94.
107 Id. at 257.
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tions.10 8 Mortenson's analysis is incomplete as it fails to give adequate
consideration to the implication of his argument on "contribution to
economic development" as one of the main objectives of the ISCID Con-
vention. The commentator was more frustrated about the failure of the
Convention to define "investment" in much broader terms to include"any plausible economic activity" because he saw the compromise in
Article 25 (4) as an appeasement to an influential Latin American Ex-
ecutive Director of the World Bank.109
2. The International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes
The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty that provides for
the settlement of investment disputes through arbitration. It estab-
lished the Center to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes between State Parties and Nationals of the signa-
tories to the Convention according to the provisions of the ICSID Con-
vention. 1 10 In other words, the Center facilitates the resolution of
investment disputes and does not by itself directly adjudicate invest-
ment disputes between contending parties. Through the ratification of
the ICSID Convention, State Parties consent to the enforcement of the
protections of foreign investments in exchange for private interna-
tional investments to develop the host economy.'1 1 Sornarajah con-
tends that a critical factor influencing the negotiation of the ICSID
Convention was the desire of developed economies to increase protec-
tions for their investors abroad." 2 It has been held that the Center is
conducive to the security of foreign investments through the provision
of the mechanism for investment treaty arbitration."' Therefore, it
may be argued that the Center was established as part of a mechanism
for the protection of foreign investments." 4
The primary seat of the Center is the principal office of the
World Bank in Washington, D.C. But, the seat of the Center for the
108 Id. at 292.
109 Id.
110 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Art. 1(2).
'I' See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration
and the Rule of Law, GLOBAL Bus. & DEVEL. L.J. 337, 338 (2007) (analogously
noting that "treaties offer foreign investors a series of economic rights, including
the right to arbitrate claims, in hopes of attracting Foreign Direct Investment that
will bring a country ... economic stability").
112 MUTHUCUMMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT 41 (Cambridge Univ. Press 3rd ed. 2010).
113 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/
05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, para. 57 (Apr. 16, 2009), availa-
ble at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/cases (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
114 Id.
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purpose of investment treaty arbitration may be moved from place to
place on the approval of the administrative council.1 15 The Center
maintains a panel of Conciliators and Arbitrators that may be selected
to arbitrate investment treaty claims between State parties and for-
eign investors."' The Center's mandate is principally to address the
shortcomings of customary international law in the resolution of in-
vestment disputes between private and State parties in the mechanics
of foreign investment through private international investment.117
The advent of the Center made it possible for the first time under in-
ternational law for a foreign investor to litigate claims directed against
foreign states.1 i" Thus, Article 25 (1) provides that:
The jurisdiction of the Center shall apply to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment between a
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated by that State to
the Center) and a national of another Contracting State
which the parties in dispute consented in writing to sub-
mit to the Center. When the parties have given their con-
sent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.1 1 9
According to the ICSID Convention, a national of another Con-
tracting State includes natural and juridical persons in law.1 20 Based
on Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention, a Tribunal constituted
under the Rules of the Center may exercise jurisdiction over invest-
ment claims based on consent and agreement of the State Party and
the foreign investor.' 21 It should be noted that the task of investment
arbitration and conciliation within the framework of the Center is the
responsibility of Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunals constituted
pursuant to the ICSID Convention. In other words, the Center does
115 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Art. 2.
116 Id. at Ch. I, Art. 3.
117 See id. at Introduction.
118 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVEST-
MENT DISPUTES (ICSID) 1 (2001) This statement may also be interpreted to mean
that the right of investors to arbitrate claims against the host State may no longer
be stymied by the host State legal system or the assertion of sovereign immunity.119 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Art. 25 (1).
120 Id. Art. 25(2) a-b.
121 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Art. 26. For a more detailed examination
of the element of consent in investment treaty arbitration see CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 1, 5 (2007), available at http://www.univie.
ac.at/intlaw/conarbitr_89.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (showing how the consent
of the host State and the foreign investor to arbitrate investment claims is the
bedrock of the jurisdiction of ICSID with respect to the ICSID Convention. Pursu-
ant to the ICSID Convention, once there is consent to submit investment disputes
to arbitration, that consent in itself excludes every other remedy in law).
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not directly settle foreign investment disputes through arbitration or
conciliation.12 2
However, the ICSID Regulations and Rules that include the
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) are
not the only process for settlement of investment disputes through ar-
bitration. There are other internationally recognized arbitration rules
that may be utilized to institute investment arbitration. Examples in-
clude the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules, 123 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
Rules, 124 and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Arbitra-
tion Rules. 1 25 However, most international investment agreements
provide for ICSID arbitration. 12' Further analysis of the other Rules
that may be utilized for investment arbitration are outside the scope of
this article. 1 27 However, the analysis of the law applicable in ICSID
arbitration should recognize economic development considerations in
the host State.
II. THE LAW APPLICABLE IN ICSID ARBITRATION
The law applicable in ICSID arbitration comprises substantive
law and procedural rules. It is widely known that substantive law
must be distinguished from procedural rules where both regimes are
applicable in the resolution of disputes between parties. 1 2 1 Substan-
122 Report of Executive Directors, supra note 77, para. 15.
123 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules, available at http://www.uncitral.org.
124 The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Rules,
available at http: / / www.sccinstitute.com / skiljeforfarande-2 /regler-4.aspx .
125 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitration, available at
http://iccwbo.org.
126 Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella
Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENTS & TRADE LAW 231 (2004).
127 See id. (showing that the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules
are the most commonly used Rules in investment arbitration. State Parties and
foreign investors often define "investment" in BIT(s) and other international in-
vestment agreements that may be applicable to the investment disputes. Under
the other arbitration Rules such as UNCITRAL, ICC, SCC, a definition of invest-
ment only need satisfy the BIT or investment agreement definition, whereas an
ICSID claim would need to satisfy both the definition in the BIT itself and the
ICSID Convention. The test whether an "investment" exists in an ICSID claim is
often referred to as the "double barreled" test or the "double keyhole approach".
For a further discussion of the "double barreled" test in ICSID arbitral practice,
see also K. Yannaca-SMAlI, Definition of "Investment": An Open-ended Search for a
Balanced Approach, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREE-
MENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 249-50 (2010).
128 See JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT:
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 76-80 (14th ed. 2008).
240 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:2
tive law determines the rights and obligations while procedural rules
provide the framework for the enforcement of the rights and obliga-
tions defined by substantive law. 129 The State party and the foreign
investor choose the law applicable to ICSID arbitration based on the
doctrine of party autonomy, but ICSID arbitration procedural law or
rules are dictated by the relevant provisions of the ICSID Convention.
In other words, while the parties to international arbitration within
the framework of the ICSID Convention may agree on the applicable
procedural law, such agreement cannot be contrary to the procedural
provisions of the ICSID Convention. This limitation applies even
where a particular procedural provision could only be read into the
letters of the ICSID Convention in the context of investment treaty
arbitration.
A typical example is offered by the principle of public policy in
the application of procedural rules to regulate international arbitra-
tion. Along this line, Hirsch elaborates that the doctrine of public pol-
icy "prohibits an arbitration tribunal from applying rules that are
contrary to the public policy of the state in which an arbitration is be-
ing conducted or that of the international community."' 3 ° Hirsch's
analogy is a common principle acceptable in international commercial
arbitration, but it may be applicable to investment treaty arbitration
on the theory that arbitral Tribunals may not apply a procedural rule
that may violate a peremptory norm of international law. In what ap-
pears to be an attempt to justify the extension of the doctrine of public
policy to ICSID arbitration, this article is drawn to the instructive hy-
pothesis of Schreuer who notes that:
The matter is different with regard to certain basic inter-
national tenets that may be described as the public pol-
icy of the international community. These principles
would include but not be restricted to the peremptory
rules of international law. Examples are the prohibition
of slavery, piracy, drug trade, terrorism and genocide,
the protection of the basic principles of human rights and
the prohibition to prepare and wage an aggressive war.
Otherwise applicable rules, whether contained in the in-
vestment agreement itself or adopted by reference, which
violate these basic principles, would have been disre-
garded by an ICSID tribunal. If any theoretical justifica-
tion is needed for this conclusion, it can be found in the
foundation of ICSID in the Convention and hence in in-
129 MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 116 (1993).
130 Id. at 113.
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ternational law which, in a wider sense, is the lex fori of
ICSID arbitration.1 3 1
Schreuer's postulation above is significant to the theme of this
article in two ways. First, it alludes to an international public policy
with reference to investment arbitration in the context of the ICSID
Convention. Second, it references the foundation of the ICSID Conven-
tion as the premise of the consideration of public policy. It seems self-
evident that the foundation of the ICSID Convention and, by extension
ICSID arbitration, is international economic development and the pro-
tection of foreign investment. Therefore, it would seem that the deter-
mination of the law applicable in ICSID arbitration should recognize
considerations for contribution to economic development and the pro-
tection of foreign investment. More so, it is a basic tenet of the inter-
pretation of treaties that a treaty like the ICSID Convention should be
interpreted according to its object and purpose.13 2
The substantive law applicable to ICSID arbitration is deter-
mined in accordance to the provision of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Con-
vention, which provides:
The Tribunal shall decide disputes in accordance with
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (includ-
ing rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of inter-
national law that may be applicable. 133
Article 54(1) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules confirms the sali-
ent provisions of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention.1 3 4
Regardless of the clear provision of Article 42(1), it has been
suggested that, in practice, arbitral Tribunals employ a combination of
the intention of the parties and the law that has a reasonable connec-
tion to the investment dispute in the determination of the substantive
law that is applicable in international arbitration.1 3 5 This suggestion
131 Schreuer, supra note 118, para. 33.
132 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 29, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 335 (entered into force Jan. 28, 1980), available at http://www.un-
treaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/. . ./conventions/1 1-1969.pdf (last visited
Mar. 9, 2013).
133 ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Art. 42(1).
134 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 54(1), Apr. 2006, ICSID/11 ("The Tribu-
nal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the sub-
stance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the Tribunal shall
apply (a) the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers appli-
cable and (b) such rules of international law as the Tribunal considers
applicable.")
135 HIRSCH, supra note 129, at 117.
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is supported by the opening sentence of Article 42(1), which accords
with the doctrine of party autonomy and encourages the State parties
and foreign investors to express their intention with reference to
choice of law to enable a Tribunal to give effect to that intention. 13 6
When read in full, Article 42(1) draws a sharp distinction between the
applicable law chosen by the State party and the foreign investor and
the responsibility bestowed on the Tribunal to apply the domestic law
of the host State and principles of international law subject to conflict
of law rules.1 3 7 Pursuant to Article 42(1), the choice of law agreed to by
the State party and the foreign investor may be in a self-contained
investment agreement or national investment legislation.1 3 ICSID ju-
risprudence is consistent with the principle that where there is a con-
flict between domestic and international law, the latter prevails. 13 9
Similarly, one author explains that "where the tribunal can find no
guidance from the investment agreement on a particular issue, this
may be treated by the tribunal as an 'absence of agreement' on the
applicable law concerning that particular question."14 ° Once a Tribu-
nal determines that there is an absence of agreement on the choice of
law, that Tribunal may be guided by the second sentence of Article
42(1) which mandates an ICSID arbitration Tribunal to apply domes-
tic law and the rules of international law that may be applicable.1 4 1
The connection of foreign investment to domestic law may arise out of
a contract between the State party and the foreign investor.14 2 Once
there is a clear choice of law between the investor and the State Party
in the investment contract, the Tribunal should respect the intention
of the parties pursuant to the first part of Article 42(1).143
136 See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Art. 42(1).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration Proceedings, Final Award, Mar.14, 2003) 9 ICSID Rep. 291, para. 91,
where the Tribunal held, inter alia, that "[t]o the extent that there is a conflict
between a national law and international law, the arbitral tribunal shall apply
international law."
140 Richard H. Kreindler, The Law Applicable to International Investment Dis-
putes, in 19 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ARBITRATING FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT DISPUTES, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 401, 406
(Norbert Horn ed., 2004).
141 Id.
142 Yas Banifatemi, The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in AR.i-
TRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 191, 196 (Katia Yan-
naca-Small ed., 2010).
143 See Emmanuel Gaillard, The Role of the Arbitrator in Determining the Applica-
ble Law, in THE LEADING ARBITRATOR'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 185,
XX (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
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However, the language of the second sentence of Article 42 (1)
appears to give ICSID arbitration Tribunals the discretion to deter-
mine the applicable law through an analysis of the relevant law of the
host state and the principles of international law. 144 On one hand, and
with reference to the second sentence of Article 42 (1), the host state
law is relevant only to the extent that it is not in conflict with the
principles of international law.1 4 5 On the other hand, the exercise of
discretion conferred on arbitral Tribunals by the second sentence of
Article 42 (1) could be unpredictable and lead to inconsistency in the
interpretation of the second sentence of Article 42 (1) of the ICSID
Convention. 146 The major driving force of this distinction is the extent
of the application of domestic law and rules of international law. 147
Banifatemi comments that a fundamental problem for Tribunals may
be striking a balance of the law applicable in investment arbitration in
the absence of an unequivocal choice of law clause. 14' Two ICSID arbi-
tration cases demonstrate the unpredictability of arbitral Tribunals
and find support in Banifatemi's skepticism with reference to the sec-
ond sentence of Article 42 (1).
In Wena Hotels Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt,1 4 9 the ad hoc
committee considered whether the Tribunal applied the applicable
Egyptian law pursuant to the second sentence of Article 42(1).15o In
the absence of a clear choice of law pursuant to Article 42(1), the ad
hoc Committee held that in determining the applicable law, the his-
144 Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of 'and' in Article 42(1),
Second Sentence, Of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in
the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18(2) ICSID REV. 375, 380 (2003) ("International
law is thus part of the equation from the outset. The task for the tribunal deciding
on any dispute pursuant to the second sentence of Article 42(1) is therefore to
determine the respective roles of the law of the host State and of international
law.").
145 Id. at 381 ("A cursory reading of the literature and case law on the topic might
lead to the conclusion that there exists a quasi-unanimous understanding accord-
ing to which, in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the role of interna-
tional law is limited to supplementing the law of the host State where it contains
lacunae or to correcting it where it is inconsistent with international law. Under
this reading, the word 'and' in the second sentence of Article 42(1) is understood as
meaning 'and, in case of lacunae, or should the law of the Contracting State be
inconsistent with international law."').
146 See generally id. at 398 ("In the context of the choice of law process of the
second sentence of Article 42(1) .. .the corrective role of international law is not
devoid of ambiguities.").
147 See id. at 380.
148 Banifatemi, supra note 144, at 201.
149 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Annul-
ment Proceeding (Feb. 5, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 129 (2004), 41 I.L.M. 933 (2002).
150 Id. 21.
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tory of the ICSID Convention allowed for both domestic and interna-
tional law to have a role.15 1 It added that both legal orders could be
applied where there is justification, and likewise, international law
can be applied by itself. 152 This decision is in sharp contrast with the
ruling of the Tribunal in Klockner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United
Republic of Cameroon.1" 3 In this annulment proceeding, the ad hoc
Committee considered the question whether the application of domes-
tic law pursuant to Article 42 (1) can be fulfilled by reference to one
basic principle. 15 4 The ad hoc Committee apparently examined this
query against the second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Con-
vention. 15 5 In response to the question, the ad hoc Committee held
that "Article 42(1) clearly does not allow the arbitrator to base his deci-
sion solely on the 'rules' or 'principles of international law.' 1 5 ' Accord-
ing to the ad hoc Committee, the "arbitrators may have recourse to the'principles of international law' only after having inquired into and es-
tablished in the content of the law of the State party to the dispute...
and after having applied the relevant rules of the State's law."1 7
III. DOES INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION MECHANISM
ATTRACT FDI?
On the hypothesis that FDI contributes to economic develop-
ment, it is fair to ask whether investment treaty arbitration mecha-
nism attracts FDI. 158 It has been suggested that the substantive or
procedural right to investment treaty arbitration is one of the strong-
est incentives for the protection of foreign investment in the host
State.15 9 As mentioned earlier, investment arbitration is designed to
restore investors' confidence and promote foreign investment against
the limitations presented by the traditional methods of investment dis-
pute resolution under customary international law.1 6 ° The protection
of foreign investment is a critical component of the international in-
151 Id. 37
152 Id. 40.
153 Kiockner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon, ICSID
Case No. ARB/81/2, Annulment Proceedings (May 3, 1985), 2 ICSID Rep. 95
(1994).
154 See id. 68.
155 Id.
156 Id. 69.
157 Id.
158 See e.g. Franck, supra note 111, at 354 ("Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pro-
moting FDI?").159 Id. at 341.
160 See supra, Part L.A.
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vestment regime. 16 1 It is unlikely that a foreign investor will engage in
FDI in the host State without concrete assurances for the protection of
foreign investment. 162 One way this has been done is through the con-
sent to investment treaty arbitration, a means by which the foreign
investor can enforce his substantive and procedural rights against the
host State. 16 3
Before embarking on the journey that metamorphosed into the
ICSID Convention, the World Bank also espoused that the proposed
dispute resolution mechanism is aimed to improve the investment cli-
mate and would thereby tend to promote the flow of private capital.1 6 4
It was against this background that the World Bank took steps to
study an international arrangement to facilitate the settlement of in-
vestment disputes between State parties and foreign investors that
eventually led to the ICSID Convention. 16 5 However, protection of for-
eign investment is not the only factor that may stimulate FDI. 166 Po-
tential foreign investors may also consider economic and political
factors like market size, production costs, and political stability of the
host State.1 6 7 Nonetheless, the protection of foreign investment ap-
pears to be one of the most critical considerations in the conduct of FDL
from the perspective of the foreign investor. 168 Thus, it would seem
that if there is no protection mechanism, the consideration of the other
factors may become unnecessary.
Nevertheless, the influence of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism in attracting FDI is a contested issue. Some commentators be-
lieve that dispute settlement mechanisms, such as arbitration, attract
FDI, but others insist that isolating investment arbitration from other
substantive treaty rights may be impracticable. 16 9 There is limited
161 See Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. 131, 136 ("[T]he expansion of investment protections is designed
to facilitate increased globalization through international investment.").
162 See e.g. Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment
and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 22 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 587, 2003),
available at http:/ / econpapers. repec.org /paper / wdipapers / 2003-587. htm ("In the
extreme, the distrust on both sides can be so large that little or no investment
takes place, even when this investment would be beneficial to both parties.").
163 See generally, Franck, supra note 111, at 341-45.
164 See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 49.
165 See id.
166 See Franck, supra note 111, at 349.
167 See id.
168 See, e.g., Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 162, at 22.
169 Compare Franck, supra note 112, at 354-55 (stating that there is mixed evi-
dence that investment treaties promote foreign direct investment), and Swenson,
supra note 162, at 133-34 (contending that dispute-settlement procedures under
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empirical evidence in favor of either position of the debate. 170 How-
ever, based on the antecedents of the ICSID Convention, the limita-
tions of customary international law on the settlement of disputes
between the foreign investor and the State party, and the relationship
of FDI to economic development, a brief examination of the hypothesis
on the issue is relevant to the task of this article.
Franck employed three hypothetical models with some evi-
dence to explain the likely impact of investment treaty arbitration in
attracting FDI to developing and host States. 17 1 These models are: the
Place Holding Model, the Political and Economic Reality Model, and
the Market Liberalization Model. 172 Franck adopts these models to de-
scribe the overriding consideration of foreign investors that deter-
mines the flow of private international capital compared to the
hypothesis that investment treaty arbitration mechanism attracts
FDI. 173 With reference to the Place Holding Model, the author theo-
rized that foreign investors may overlook the consideration of invest-
ment treaty arbitration mechanisms to invest in a country that will
provide an opportunity for them to establish a place in the economy of
the host country.174 The author cited China as a typical example of
this model. 175 Franck conceded that an empirical evaluation of China's
BITs may give a better picture of the effect of its BITs. 176 But China's
success with attracting FDI has been traced to its extensive treaty net-
work, offering an investment treaty arbitration mechanism to foreign
investors for settlement of investment disputes. 177 Nonetheless,
Franck's theory may be true prior to China's reform and expansion of
its investment treaty network including its unconditional consent to
arbitration under the ICSID Convention.
On the hypothesis of the Political and Economic Reality Model,
Franck articulated that political and economic stability of the host
State will make provisions for investment treaty arbitration unneces-
investment treaties reduce the uncertainty foreign investors believe they face in a
host State), with Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
increase Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries?, LSE RESEARCH ON-
LINE 28 (Feb. 2006), http://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/WorldDev-(BITs).pdf
(stating that foreign direct investments negligibly increased following a substan-
tial increase in bilateral investment treaties.)
170 See Franck supra note 111, at 355
171 Id. at 357
172 Id.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 359.
175 Id. at 358.
176 Id. at 358-59.
177 NORA GALLAGHER & WENHU SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES
AND PRACTICE 28, 29 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).
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sary. 178 Franck referred to Australia as an example, citing the Free
Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States that re-
tains permission with the Contracting Parties to permit arbitration of
investment claims between the foreign investor and the State party. 179
It is conceivable that a stable economic and political environment may
positively impact FDI in the host state, but the premise of this model
appears to be based on the presumption that in a stable political envi-
ronment investment disputes are rare and unlikely. Even where they
occur, the decision to authorize investment arbitration lies with the
Contracting Parties, as in the case between Australia and the United
States concerning the Australian-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (AUSFTA).' s ° In fact, Article 11.16 (1) of AUSFTA provides:
If a [Contracting] Party considers that there has been a
change in circumstances affecting the settlement of dis-
putes on matters within the scope of this chapter and
that, in the light of such change, the Parties should con-
sider allowing an investor of a party to submit to arbitra-
tion with the other Party a claim regarding a matter
within the scope of this chapter, the Party may request
consultations with the other Party on the subject, includ-
ing the development of procedures that may be appropri-
ate. On such a request, the Parties shall promptly enter
into consultations with a view towards allowing such a
claim and establishing such procedures. 8 1
Notwithstanding the above provision, Article 11.16(2) of
AUSFTA allows an investor to bring or arbitrate an investment claim
directly against the other Party to the extent that it is permitted under
that Party's law.'8 2 The provision in the AUSFTA may be likened to
diplomatic intervention. The requirement of consultation at the in-
stance of either of the State Parties may subject investors to the same
limitations under customary international law that negatively im-
pacted FDI. The conflicts of interest that may result through diplo-
matic intervention spurred consideration for an alternative
international arrangement for the settlement of investment dispute
that was championed by the World Bank.l8 3 Under international law,
the espousal of diplomatic intervention and protection in the context of
178 Franck, supra note 111, at 361.
179 Id.
180 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004 (entered into
force 1 January 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agree
ments/australian-fta/final-text (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) [hereinafter AUSFTA].
181 Id. Art. 11.16(1).
182 Id. Art. 11.16(2).
183 Franck, supra note 111, at 371-73.
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international investment law is absolutely within the discretion of
States.'18 The exercise of this discretion, more often than not, is sub-
ject to overriding political interests that may be at variance with the
interests of the foreign investor. 185
Furthermore, through the Market Liberalization Model,
Franck explains that reformation and modernization of an interna-
tional investment regime in the host State will attract FDI regardless
of whether or not there exists a mechanism for investment treaty arbi-
tration.18 6 The author relied on the limited presence or absence of in-
vestment treaty arbitration mechanisms in the international
investment regimes of countries such as Brazil and Ireland. Franck
made her strongest point with the examples of Brazil.. 7 and Ire-
land,' which have a commendable attraction of FDI in spite of the
near absence of provisions for investment treaty arbitration in their
respective international investment regimes. But, as the author noted,
some trading countries are still skeptical and have been urging Brazil,
for example, to reform its international investment regime to reflect
international standard and best practices that includes investment
treaty arbitration."l 9
There is no question that investment treaty arbitration mecha-
nism is an incentive that can attract FDI to host States. Justice Mo-
hammed Uwais, a former Chief Justice of Nigeria, argued that the
mechanism for investment arbitration is a critical element to attract
foreign investments into Nigeria, a developing country. According to
Justice Uwais, "[t]he importance of international arbitration as the
preferred choice of settlement of commercial and investment disputes
cannot be over-emphasized." ° Some commentators merely suggest
that an investment treaty arbitration mechanism should not be iso-
lated from other treaty rights contained in international investment
184 JuHA Kuusi, THE HOST STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 36-40 (Saxon House, 1979).
185 Id.
186 Franck, supra note 111 at 362.
187 Id. Brazil has no BIT in force. Resolution of foreign investment disputes are
regulated by national investment legislation.
188 Id. at 362-63. The Republic of Ireland has only one BIT in force, which is with
the Czech Republic.See Agreement between the Czech Republic and Ireland for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed Jun. 28, 1996 (en-
tered into force Dec. 1, 2011) (Czech-Ireland BIT), available at http://www.dfa.ie/
• . ./TREATY%20Series%202012/no.26%20ofYo202012.pdf, (last visited Mar. 11,
2013).
189 Franck, supra note 111, at 364.
190 Mohammed Uwais, Arbitration Will Attract Foreign Investment to Nigeria,
VANGUARD NEWSPAPER (LAGOS), Nov. 26, 2013, http://www.vanguardngr.com/e-
editions/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
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agreements."' Even if one concedes to the reservations of the "non-
isolationists," it is hypothesized that the concept of the protection of
foreign investment is incomplete without a mechanism for investment
treaty arbitration. This article contends that investment treaty arbi-
tration mechanisms attract FDI. One of the major reasons for the
proliferation of investment treaties is the procedural and substantive
rights it offers to foreign investors to arbitrate investment claims di-
rectly against the host State.
IV. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF FDI
The classical theory of foreign investments explains the rela-
tionship between foreign investment and economic development.1 92
The classical theory of foreign investment theorizes that the purpose of
foreign investment is to develop the host economy.19 3 The premise of
this theory is that foreign investments ought to be utterly beneficial to
the host economy.' 94 This theory supports the hypotheses of this arti-
cle on the relationship between foreign investment and economic de-
velopment. Ball conveyed a convincing thesis on what appears to be
the basis of the classical theory when he noted that "nations that elect
to pursue policies that tend to eliminate the private sector or discrimi-
nate against outside investment should be aware that they are deny-
ing themselves a source of capital that could otherwise greatly speed
their own economic development."'99 Finding support in Ball,
Sornarajah explains that the classical theory is supported by the fact
that foreign capital exported into the host State through the process of
foreign investment could be used for the public good which translates
to economic development.1 96 In this regard, Schreuer added that the
impact of foreign investment on the host State economy accelerates
creation of employment, infrastructural development, and technology
transfer, and positively impacts facilities such as health care and
transportation for the benefit of the investor and the domestic econ-
omy.1 97 The main gist of the classical theory is in accord with develop-
ment economics, which encourages the economic interaction of local
191 Stephan W. Schill, Investment Treaties: Instruments of Bilateralism or Ele-
ments of an Evolving Multilateral System?, 4TH GLOBAL ADMIN. L. SEMINAR (June
13-14, 2008).
192 See generally Sornarajah, supra note 112, at 48-52.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 George Ball, Address to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, (1964) extracted from Kuusi, supra note 184, at 37.
196 Sornarajah, supra note 112, at 51.
197 Id.
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resources with private international capital to maximize the benefit of
foreign investment to the domestic economy.' 9 8
Development economics is a branch of economic theory that
specifically focuses on institutions and policies that regulate the pro-
cess of economic development in under-developed countries. 19 9 The
theory of economic development is a form of economic liberalism that
metamorphosed from a movement concerned with finding an end to
international poverty. 20 0 The theory of economic liberalism is based on
the assumption that industrialization is the path to economic develop-
ment, and that developing countries should create an environment for
the capital that will facilitate industrialization for such develop-
ment.20 1 The classical theory is further strengthened by the notion
that no meaningful economic development can take place in develop-
ing countries in the absence of foreign investment. As a result, the
standing of foreign investment as a critical component of the interna-
tional development agenda cannot be overemphasized.2 °2
Furthermore, the place and importance of foreign investment
created the need for concerted efforts by international institutions not
only to facilitate the flow of international investment, but to create
measures and international policies that might guarantee the protec-
tion of investments. Sornarajah's thesis articulates that "focus on
these beneficial aspects of the foreign investment flows enables the
making of the policy-oriented argument that foreign investment must
be protected by international law."20 3
The prescriptions of the classical theory may also be reflected
in international instruments regulating the conduct of international
investment law. The preamble of the ICSID Convention that alludes to
the promotion and protection of foreign investment for the economic
development of the host State is a classic expression of the classical
theory of foreign investment.2 "4 Similarly, the purpose and object of
most international investment treaties are expressed in accordance
with the hypotheses of the classical theory of foreign investment.2 °5
The classical theory may also find eloquent expression in what Yusuf
describes as the progression from the "rules of abstention" to the "rules
198 Cf id. at 51.
199 See Debraj Ray, Development Economics, 1-5 (2007), available at http://www.
econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/Papers/RayPalgrave.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).200 Id.
201 Id. See also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: His-
TORY, POLICY, INTERPRETATION 90 ( 2010).202 Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law, 8 J.
WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 357 (2007).
203 Sornarajah, supra note 112, at 52.
204 Id. at 50.
205 Id.
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of international co-operation" in the development of the rules of inter-
national law to reflect the emergence of a legal framework for eco-
nomic development in developing countries.20 6 Yusuf uses his thesis to
argue the case for a special treatment for low-income countries as the
basis to address the reality of economic inequality. 20 7 In Yusufs analy-
sis, "the rules of abstention" created a system where interaction be-
tween sovereign States was dominated by the politics of avoiding war
that was based on reciprocity, with little or no emphasis on interna-
tional cooperation between States.20 ' The premise of the "rules of in-
ternational co-operation" progresses from the theory of abstention that
recognizes the need for maximizing international collaborative efforts"which in turn may widen the perception of these common interests
and of the collaborative efforts to be undertaken in their pursuit."20 9
Yusuf added that the emergence of international co-operation was ne-
cessitated by the occurrence of international events that shaped the
character of international law in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. 2 0 The author alluded to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the
emergence of the socialist States in Eastern Europe, a massive trend of
independence of former colonies in Asia and Africa, and the greater
involvement of States in the control of economic activities prior to
World War If.211
Nevertheless, the classical theory of foreign investment has
been criticized for promoting inequality in the host State and for not
doing enough to eradicate poverty among the poor in the host State.2 12
In this sense, poverty is a symptom of underdevelopment in the host
State. There are also legitimate concerns that the repatriation of capi-
tal by the foreign investor from the host State is much more than the
capital inflow associated with the particular investment, thereby de-
nying the host economy much needed capital that could be reinvested
into the local economy to promote economic development. Similarly,
technology transfer to the host State through foreign investment may
not be as advantageous as presumed. According to Sornarajah, "it is
usually the case that the technology that is introduced into the host
state has become obsolescent in its state of origin."2 13 Indeed, the
transfer of management skills to local workers is uncommon with for-
206 ABDULQAWI YUSUF, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING
STATES: A STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24, 24-25 (1982).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 24.
209 Id. at 24-25.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 25.
212 VANDEVELDE, supra note 201, at 97.
213 Sornarajah, supra note 112, at 49.
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eign investors in host States.2 14 The social corporate responsibility of
foreign investors in the form of infrastructural development that may
include provision of healthcare, education, energy, and social services
are illusory in most cases.215 The criticisms of FDI in this respect are
valid. For example, the presence of oil giants Shell Global and Chevron
Oil operating in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta has done little to im-
prove the economic development of the Ogoni region.2 16
Despite the legitimate questions and criticisms of the classical
theory of foreign investment, its underpinnings still dominate the phe-
nomenon of globalization. As shown above, the classical theory is at
the heart of international investment law's progressive development.
The purpose of FDI, from the perspective of the host State, is not in
doubt; the protection of international investments in the host State
was at issue because of the limitations for the protection of foreign
investment created for the foreign investor by the nuances of custom-
ary international law. The promotion and protection of international
investment should not be divorced from the purpose of international
investments. The criticisms of the classical theory of foreign invest-
ment perhaps demonstrate that the problem with the classical theory
is how to properly harness its tenets to ensure protection and promo-
tion of foreign investment for economic development. If there is evi-
dence that foreign investment promotes economic growth, then there
is a stronger case for the recognition that foreign investment "contrib-
ute[s] to the economic development" of the host State in the context of
investment arbitration.
V. THE SGS CASES REVISITED: WHY "CONTRIBUTION TO
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
IN ICSID ARBITRATION.
It is important to understand the divergent interests of the ma-
jor players in foreign investment when defining the term "invest-
ment."2 17 These interests may be reflected by two important
considerations. First, foreign investors either directly or, within the
framework of an applicable international investment agreement, usu-
ally ensure that foreign investments are structured beyond a mere
214 Id. at 49-50.
215 Id. at 50.
216 Id. at 79.
217 From an investment treaty arbitration perspective, the major players con-
nected with conduct of FDI within the framework of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and other international investment agreements are: the foreign investors (which is
either a natural or legal person from the State party), the host government and
ICSID. See STEPHEN D. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN Di-
RECT INVESTMENTS (2007).
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contractual relationship to maximize the advantages offered by inter-
national arbitration. Such safeguards are mostly determined through
an assessment of the definition of "investment" in an investment
agreement or other laws that form part of the host State's legal frame-
work for the conduct of foreign investment relating to the transaction
in issue.2 1 s Second, host States prefer a definition of "investment" that
could stimulate the flow of foreign investments that have the potential
to impact economic development. In what appears to be a confirmation
of these contrasting interests, it has been argued that, "treaties [BITs]
offer foreign investors a series of economic rights, including the right
to arbitrate claims in hopes of attracting FDI that will bring a country
infrastructure projects, financing, know-how, new jobs, and economic
reality."219
These contrasting interests on the definition of "investment"
under the ICSID Convention were played out in the ICSID arbitration
case of SGS Societe Gdndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines.2 2 ° In this case, the Republic of the Philippines entered
into an agreement with Societe Gin6rale de Surveillance S.A. (SGS), a
Swiss company, to carry out, on an exclusive basis, Pre-Shipment In-
spection (PSI) in any country of export to the Philippines.2 21 Under the
contract, inspection would cover quality, quantity, and price compari-
sons. 222 The relevant articles of the agreement required SGS to main-
tain a liaison office in the Philippines and to provide, free of charge,
training courses for the Philippines Bureau of Customs (BOC), the pro-
vision of customs equipment to the BOC and maintenance thereof, in-
telligence/investigative consultants, and a library stocked with the
most comprehensive trade publications from the twenty leading ex-
porting countries to the Philippines. 223 The agreement at issue pro-
vided that all provisions were to be governed in all respects and
construed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, and all dis-
putes in connection with the obligations of either party to the agree-
ment shall be filed in the Regional Trial Courts of Makati or
Manila. 22 4 In exchange for the performance of SGS's obligations, the
Philippines agreed to pay SGS, in Swiss francs, a fee amounting to 0.6
218 Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2,lndividual Concurring Opinion, 3 2, (Mar. 15,
2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 310 (2004).
219 Franck, supra note 111, at 338.
220 SGS Soci~t6 G~n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, IC-
SID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction, IT
99-100, (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005).
221 Id. 19.
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percent of the Free On Board (FOB) value declared on the exporter's
final settlement invoice covering each shipment inspected.2 2 5 The
Philippines and Switzerland have a binding treaty agreement for the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments.2 26
SGS commenced investment treaty arbitration for alleged
breaches of the agreement between it and the Republic of the Philip-
pines by relying on the provisions of the Swiss-Philippines BIT.2 27 Cit-
ing relevant provisions of the BIT, SGS initiated arbitration under
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention contending that: there is a dis-
pute of a legal nature, arising directly out of an investment, between a
contracting State and a national of another contracting State, and the
parties have consented in writing to ICSID arbitration. 22 ' The Repub-
lic of the Philippines challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, con-
tending that there was no "investment" in the Philippines in
accordance with the purpose of the ICSID Convention.2 29 The Philip-
pines also argued that the dispute was purely contractual. 23 0 The Tri-
bunal found for SGS, holding that the circumstances and elements of
the services provided by SGS were sufficient to qualify the service as
one provided in the Philippines. 231 According to the Tribunal, "[s]ince
it was a cost to SGS to provide it, this was enough to amount to an
"investment" in the Philippines within the BIT. 2 3 2
In the earlier case of SGS Societe Gdndrale de Surveillance S.A.
v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,2 3 3 SGS and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan entered into a PSI Agreement signed in 1994 similar to the
service agreement signed with the Philippines. The PSI Agreement in-
cluded an arbitration clause that provided that all disputes must be
225 Id. 20.
226 Accord Entre la Confederation Suisse et la Republique des Philippines Con-
cernant la Promotion et la Protection R6ciproque des Investissements. [Agreement
Between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of the Philippines on the Pro-
motion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment], Switz.-Phil., Mar. 31, 1997,
available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland-philippines-
fr.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
227 Philippines, 8 ICSID Rep. 518, 26.
228 The ICSID Convention established the jurisdictional requirements of invest-
ment treaty arbitration. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at Art. 25(1).
229 Philippines, 8 ICSID Rep. 518, 51
230 Id.
231 Id. 112 (concluding that the dispute regarding "services" was within the
meaning of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention).
232 Id. p 103 (explaining the elements are sufficient when taken together).
233 SGS Soci6t6 G6n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01113, (Aug. 6, 2003), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
(last accessed Feb. 9, 2003).
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settled in Pakistan.2 34 The dispute in this case arose when SGS al-
leged a breach of contract against Pakistan for failing to make timely
payments under the contract.2 3 5 When communications initiated by
the parties to resolve the issue failed, SGS filed suit against Pakistan
in the Swiss Court of First Instance in Switzerland. 23 6 Pakistan pre-
vailed in the Swiss courts2 3 7 when it contended that, in the PSI Agree-
ment, the parties had chosen to arbitrate any disputes arising out of
the contract before an arbitration tribunal in Pakistan.2 3 SGS later
brought a claim against Pakistan at the Center in accordance with Ar-
ticle 9(2) of the Swiss-Pakistan BIT that provided for arbitration
within the framework of the ICSID Convention.23 9 Before the Tribu-
nal, SGS contended that Pakistan violated Article 11 of the BIT by
failing to guarantee observance of its contractual commitments. 24 0 The
tribunal, while siding with Pakistan held that it had no jurisdiction
over contractual claims and decided conclusively in favor of SGS that
it has jurisdiction over SGS BIT claims.2 4 1
The focus of this article is the impact of the Tribunals' decision
on the definition of "investment" with respect to considerations of con-
tribution to economic development. It is apparent that the Tribunals
in the SGS cases adopted a broad interpretation of the BITs in ques-
tion to determine that the service contracts and subject matter of the
disputes were protected "investments" in the applicable BITs. SGS
prevailed on the issue of jurisdiction in the Philippines case because
that Tribunal was of the view that since "a substantial and non-sever-
able aspect of the overall service was provided in the Philippines ...
SGS entitlement to be paid was contingent upon that aspect. 2 4 2 How-
ever, the basis of the definition of "investment" ought to be the inten-
234 Id. 1.
235 Id. 12.
236 Id. 19-20.
237 Id. 23. The Swiss Courts rejected SGS claim because of the arbitration clause
in the PSI agreement.
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tion of the State party and the foreign investor on what constitutes an
"investment" within the framework of the ICSID Convention, and not
on the discretion of an arbitral Tribunal unsupported by any concrete
rules of interpretation within the enabling ICSID Convention with ref-
erence to the definition of "investment."
It is a truism that the foreign investor has had no part in the
negotiation of the ICSID Convention. This fact raises the issue of in-
vestment in "Arbitration without Privity"24 3 and undermines the rele-
vance of the intention of the State party and the foreign investor in the
context of ICSID arbitration and treaty law. Generally, the agreement
to arbitrate is a contract binding on the parties that have agreed to it.
However, this article contends that the investor-state relationship,
with reference to ICSID arbitration, integrates the concept of privity
because the ICSID Convention was formulated between States for the
benefit of the States parties and nationals of other States.
In the Philippines case, the Tribunal accepted SGS's argument
that its assets in the Philippines pursuant to the contract, juxtaposed
with the BIT under review, fell within the "non exhaustive definition
of [foreign] investments under Article 1(2) of the BIT."24 4 In that Tri-
bunal's determination of an "investment," this paper contends that the
Tribunal should have made a "contribution to economic development"
consideration of the protected investment in accordance with the pur-
pose of the ICSID Convention. Once the issue of whether or not there
is an "investment" in the territory of the host State is raised by either
the State party or foreign investor, a Tribunal should consider "contri-
bution to economic development" of the investment in issue. The pro-
tection of foreign investments and the attraction of foreign capital to
promote domestic economic development are paramount to the conduct
of foreign investment in host States. The protection of foreign invest-
ments through the mechanism of the ICSID Convention makes it im-
perative to consider why States enter into International Investment
Agreements ("IIAs").
On the intentions of States in entering IAs and in interna-
tional investment law, Garcia-Bolivar opined that States enter into
IAs to protect foreign investments with the expectation to attract for-
eign capital to promote domestic economic development. 24 5 Garcia-Bo-
livar argued that the expectation of States should be interpreted to
243 See generally Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 FOREIGN INV. L.J.
232, 232-57 (1995).
244 Philippines, 8 ICSID Rep. 518, 48-49.
245 Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Economic Development at the Core of the Interna-
tional Investment Law Regime, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND AR-
BITRATION 587 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 011).
2014]ENDANGERED ELEMENT OF ICSID ARBITRAL PRACTICE 257
include the protection of foreign investment and the anticipated do-
mestic economic development of the host economy.2 46
In the face of the inconsistent approach of arbitral practice to"contribution to economic development" as a core element in invest-
ment treaty arbitration,2 4 7 the arbitral panel in Malaysian Historical
Salvors Sdn. Bhd v. Malaysia held that, for a foreign investment to
come under the adjudicative mechanism of the ICSID, it must be
shown that there is a substantial contribution to the economic develop-
ment of the recipient State.2 4 s Prior to this case, the panel in Ceskos-
lovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S v. Slovak Republic24 9 relied on the
preamble of the ICSID Convention to infer "an international transac-
tion which contributes to cooperation designed to promote the eco-
nomic development of a Contracting State may be deemed to be an
investment as that term is understood in the Convention. 2 50
Other Tribunals have disagreed with the approach of the arbi-
tral Tribunals in the Malaysian Historical Salvors and Slovak Repub-
lic. As shown in this article, arbitral Tribunals have registered
inconsistent views with respect to defining investment. On the other
hand, Garcia-Bolivar's proposition was based on what ought to be the
basic core element of the adjudicative principle of treaty investment
arbitration.2 5 1 Still, it is argued that international investment agree-
ments should contain express provisions that reflect the intentions of
the State parties that execute BITs.
The purpose and preamble of investment agreements are insuf-
ficient to convey the intention of the State parties of BITs. A system of
arbitration that leaves room for speculation as to the parties' inten-
tions with investment treaty arbitration is bound to produce inconsis-
tencies that could negatively impact the credibility of the process. The
conduct of FDI through BITs, though revolutionary, cannot sustain the
development of international investment law if its purpose is only to
correct the limitations of multilateral treaties to resolve the uncertain-
ties of customary international law in favor of foreign investors from
developed economies.
Garcia-Bolivar's thesis is in accord with the dissenting opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen in Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malay-
246 Id.
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sia.25 2 Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out that a proper consideration of
ICSID objective jurisdiction with reference to the definition of "invest-
ment" includes a requirement for a consideration of "contribution to
the economic development of the host state."2 5 3 According to Judge
Shahabuddeen, "the need for a contribution to the economic develop-
ment of the host State is consistent with both the formative documents
of ICSID and case law."25 4 Indeed, the preamble of the ICSID Conven-
tion states, inter alia, that the ICSID Convention was formulated "con-
sidering the need for international co-operation for economic
development, and the role of private international investment therein;
bearing in mind that from time to time disputes may arise in connec-
tion with such investments between Contracting States and nationals
of other Contracting States."2 5 5 Commenting on the preamble of the
ICSID Convention, the Tribunal in Slovak Republic stated that "[tIhis
language permits an inference that an international transaction which
contributes to the co-operation designed to promote the economic de-
velopment of a Contracting State may be deemed to be an investment
as that term is understood in the Convention."2 5 6 Similarly, in Patrick
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Tribunal cited the
opinion of Schreuer on the interpretation of the preamble of the ICSID
Convention, that contribution to economic development is the "'only
possible indication of an objective meaning' of the term
'investment.' ,2 5 7
If the raison d'tre of the host States for entering IIAs is to at-
tract capital that would finance and promote economic development, a
consideration of whether or not a particular transaction is an "invest-
ment" within the scope of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention ought
to include contribution to economic development. This article contends
that the objective requirements of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Conven-
tion, with reference to the definition of "investment," when considered
together with the purpose of the ICSID Convention, put economic de-
velopment and the protection of foreign investments at the core of IC-
SID arbitration and the international investment law regime.
Therefore, in the absence of a concrete definition of "investment" in the
ICSID Convention, an "investment" should not be determined under
the ICSID Convention in the absence of a consideration of contribution
252 Malaysian Historical Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, (Shahabuddeen, J.,
dissenting), (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases
(last visited Dec. 7, 2013).
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to economic development. Such construction would be contrary to the
object and purpose of the ICSID Convention.
The view of the Tribunal in Joy Mining Machinery Limited v.
Arab Republic of Egypt2 5 ought to guide arbitral Tribunals. This Tri-
bunal made a convincing point when it held that, for the purpose of
ICSID jurisdiction, the parties to an investment dispute cannot by
agreement define "investment" outside the objective requirements of
Article 25 of the Convention, otherwise Article 25's definition of "in-
vestment" will be nugatory.2 5 9 If the SGS Tribunals had considered
contribution to economic development of the host State, substantial
parts of the contract in the SGS cases that were performed outside the
host State might have been critical in the determination of the mean-
ing of "investment" with reference to Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention.
However, a fundamental weakness of the consideration of con-
tribution to economic development within the meaning of Article 25(1)
of the ICSID Convention is how to determine investments that contrib-
ute to the domestic economic development of the host State. Do they
have to be substantial, significant, or only minimal? ICSID case law on
the consideration of contribution to economic development has been
inconsistent on the issue. Some Tribunals that have attempted to con-
sider contribution to economic development in the context of Article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention have applied different paradigms on
what transactions constitute a contribution to the economic develop-
ment of the host State. In Malaysian Historical Salvors, the Tribunal
held that for a transaction to contribute to the economic development
of the host State, the "contract must have made a significant contribu-
tion to the development of the respondent."2 6 ° According to this Tribu-
nal, "were there not the requirement of significance, any contract
which enhances the Gross Domestic Product of an economy by any
amount, however small, would qualify as an investment. '2 6 1 However,
in CSOB, the Tribunal considered the benefits of a loan contribution to
the host State's public interests to reach a decision that the loan, even
though devoid of visible transfer of resources, was an "investment"
that contributed to the economic development of the Slovak
Republic.2 6 2
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In the more recent case of Inmaris v. Ukraine,2 6 3 contribution
to economic development was disregarded altogether. The investment
dispute in that case arose over a contract to renovate and operate a
ship owned by the Respondent for tourism and training purposes.2 6 4
The Tribunal rejected a formal approach to apply the test and held
instead that "[t]he State Parties to a BIT agree to protect certain types
of economic activity, and when they provide that disputes between in-
vestors and States relating to that activity may be resolved through,
inter alia, ICSID arbitration, that means that they believe that the
activities constitute an 'investment' within the meaning of the ICSID
Convention as well."2 6 5
The majority of the Tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvors
annulled the award of the sole arbitrator because considering contri-
bution to economic development elevated the criteria to a jurisdic-
tional requirement that excluded "small contributions of a cultural
and historical nature," which was not supported by the ICSID Conven-
tion.2 6 6 Still, in the opinion of this article, the difficulty and inconsis-
tency expressed by some Tribunals in the analysis of the criteria
should not be construed to mean that contribution to economic devel-
opment is irrelevant with reference to the meaning of "investment" in
the ICSID Convention. In the absence of a concrete definition of "in-
vestment" under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the Conven-
tion will be meaningless if Article 25(1) is construed to exclude
contribution to economic development contrary to the purpose of the
ICSID Convention from the perspective of the host States. As a Tribu-
nal rightly noted, "there exists a definition of an investment within the
meaning of the ICSID Convention."2 6 7
VI. CONCLUSION
In view of the preceding analysis, the mechanism of foreign in-
vestment and investment treaty arbitration particularly under the IC-
SID Convention should not to be divorced from the goal of contribution
to economic development. The expectation of host States in interna-
tional investment law is the utilization of foreign capital to promote
and advance economic development. This expectation with reference to
the ICSID Convention cannot be fully achieved in the absence of an
independent consideration of the element of contribution to economic
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development in the determination of an "investment" in ICSID arbi-
tral practice.
It has been argued in this article that the presence of the prin-
ciples of the classical theory of FDI in international investment agree-
ments is a testament to the paramount importance of economic
development. 26 ' This article contends that there is no logical counter
to the theory that contribution to economic development is the reason
that developing countries as host States embraced the idea of the IC-
SID Convention. The expectation of contributing to economic develop-
ment explains the positive attitude shown by most developing
countries in the process leading to the conclusion of the ICSID Conven-
tion and the establishment of ICSID. For example, Tunisia was the
first State to sign the ICSID Convention on May 5, 1965, and Nigeria
was the first State to ratify the ICSID Convention on August 23,
1965.269 While it may be conceded that the inconsistent investment
arbitration jurisprudence as to the definition of "investment" may
have contributed to the relegation of the consideration of contribution
to economic development, it is submitted that the embracing rubric of
the ICSID Convention should be interpreted by arbitral Tribunals be-
yond the protection of foreign investment to include consideration for
contribution to economic development of the State. This will ensure a
balanced approach to the interpretation and application of the princi-
pal objective of the ICSID Convention that might create a better op-
portunity for host States to maximize the benefits of the ICSID
Convention in the context of investment treaty arbitration.
The reasoning of most arbitral Tribunals that international in-
vestment arbitration mechanism has the final say on the adjudication
of investment disputes makes it more imperative for host States to re-
form their international investment regimes to reflect their legitimate
expectations. It is hoped that such a normative and legislative ap-
proach might bring the issue of contribution to economic development
to the altar of international arbitration to get the proper attention in
the context of the ICSID Convention. Ignoring considerations for con-
tribution to economic development in investment treaty arbitration
could fuel dissatisfaction among host States against the ICSID
Convention.
268 See supra Part II.
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